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Vietnam is a transitional country presently undergoing economic and 
other major structural reforms. Whilst it 
has retained the ideals of socialism, it has 
adopted policies more aligned to that of 
a market economy. Current property-
based taxes, which are important sources 
of revenue for government, indicate a 
fragility in terms of their sustainability. 
These taxes are mainly one-time event 
taxes and are not considered recurrent 
forms of property taxation. Revenue 
from these sources is declining and 
their reform is imperative. The Tax on 
Buildings and Land, which is levied only 
on land, has potential if it were re-engi-
neered to reflect actual land values. This 
article contends that reform is possible, 
and as the property market continues to 
mature, there should be sufficient data 
upon which a value-based property tax 
could be introduced.
The property tax exists in most coun-
tries throughout the world (McCluskey 
1999). In both principle and practice, 
this tax can have important fiscal and 
nonfiscal benefits (Bird and Slack 2004). 
The revenue that such a tax produces is 
often of critical importance to local and 
higher levels of government. However, 
its design, administration, and political 
support are fundamental components to 
ensure that the tax works effectively and 
efficiently (Bahl 1998). 
The property tax has historically been 
viewed as a local tax given that the tax 
base is immobile and located within a 
local jurisdiction (Fischel 2001). It also 
has been viewed as a key element in fiscal 
decentralisation in which local govern-
ments should raise their own revenue 
to meet local expenditures. There are 
clearly important advantages to having 
a property tax as one of the revenue 
tools for government (Bahl and Linn 
1992). However, it is equally important 
that the tax be administered in a fair 
and equitable manner to minimise any 
distortions and adverse effects such as 
regressivity (Bell 1999).
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This article provides an analysis of the 
property tax system as it currently oper-
ates in Vietnam. The discussion highlights 
the fragility of the current system in terms 
of revenue sustainability as it is based on 
declining revenue sources. The existing 
taxes are analysed and weaknesses identi-
fied. Effective tax rate analysis points to 
problems with the regressive nature of 
the current property tax. Suggestions 
are proffered on how the system should 
be re-engineered to align it more closely 
with international practice.
Legal Framework
The chaos in the aftermath of the war 
and the urgent need to rebuild commu-
nities and infrastructure along with other 
state priorities detrimentally affected 
any progress towards land management 
reform. As a member of the socialist 
bloc, the principle of a state-commanded 
economy was adopted although a more 
liberal approach to market-based policies 
was introduced over time. A summary of 
the provisions regarding land ownership 
in the Vietnamese constitutions and 
Land Laws is provided in table 1.
At first, the State essentially took 
control of many aspects of political life 
that impacted the population, such as 
housing and land-use allocation. The 
State became the owner of land and 
assumed responsibility for allocating 
land and/or housing to the population. 
Since land was deemed to be a public 
asset, land management and the devel-
opment of cadastral maps were given a 
low priority by the government. During 
the period 1975–86, land administration 
was effectively ignored and during this 
post-war period, land was considered a 
Table 1. Legal framework of land ownership
Constitutions Land Laws
1946—First Constitution 
State ownership, common 
ownership, collective ownership, 
organisation ownership, household 
ownership, and individual 
ownership of land.
No land law applicable
1959—Second Constitution 
State ownership and collective 
ownership.  
1980—Third Constitution
Land ownership by the People. 
Land was allocated without 
payment. State has the right to 
recover the land in case of necessity 
and allocate new land upon 
demand.  
1988—First Land Law 
Legalizes the allocation of land from cooperatives to households.
1992—Fourth Constitution 
Land ownership by the People. 
Vietnamese economy develops as 
a “Market Economy with Socialist 
Orientation.”
1993—Second Land Law 
State grants five rights to land users: exchange, transfer, lease, inheritance, and mortgage. 
Land is recognised as having value and land price is set by the State to regulate the economic 
relationship between the State and land users. 
State protects land rights by issuing Land Use Right Certificates to land users.
2003—Third Land Law 
State is the representative owner of all land and establishes legal framework for land 
by deciding land-use planning, land-use purpose, and land-use holding. State grants to 
users of land for residential or business purposes the right to exchange, transfer, lease, 
donate, inherit, mortgage, guarantee, and use as capital contribution. Any land recovery or 
expropriation is compensated by the State.
Amendment of Third Land Law is in preparation.
Source: Based on Vietnamese constitutions and land laws since independence in 1945
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monopoly asset of the State. A real estate 
market economy did not exist. Land was 
assigned to individuals, organisations, 
and other public enterprises on the basis 
of their residential, industrial, and com-
mercial requirements. 
One of the key drivers that led to the 
introduction of post-war land laws was 
the need to address the declining level of 
food production and, in particular, rice 
production. The policy of agricultural 
co-operatives started in the north in 1950 
and was applied to the south in 1975 
after the war. This change led to a signifi-
cant decline in agricultural output until 
the mid-1980s. With the country facing 
extreme food shortages, the perceived 
solution was to develop a more efficient 
way to maximise the production of food. 
Hence, the first Vietnamese Land Law 
was approved in 1988. Its purpose was 
to facilitate the allocation of agricultural 
land from the co-operatives to individual 
households based on a secure form of 
tenure. Allocations are based on the 
number of household members and typi-
cally last for a period of 10 to 15 years. 
Allocations can be renewed. Households 
do not have to pay rent for the land, 
but they do pay an agricultural land-use 
tax. By normalising land assignment for 
agricultural production, this policy had 
a significant impact on the growth of 
food production. 
In addition to allocating the use of 
agricultural land, land-use rights to 
nonagricultural land were assigned to 
families and other organisations. These 
usage rights were essentially nontradable 
assets with no legal means for the rights 
to be exchanged. Nevertheless, a fairly 
active, but rather informal, real estate 
market developed. During the period 
of 1991–93, Vietnam experienced its 
first real estate bull market as real estate 
prices increased tenfold (Dang 2007). 
However, the legal framework was grossly 
inadequate to support this emerging im-
mature real estate market. 
This new socio-economic environment 
required an appropriate land law to 
provide a new set of legal rules to man-
age the land and its relationship to the 
agricultural economy on one side and 
the need for infrastructure development 
to service an industrial economy on the 
other. A revised land law was therefore 
promulgated in 1993. The law aimed at 
building a legal framework to promote 
the commercialisation of agricultural 
products. Households using land ben-
efited from five rights: land exchange, 
transfer, lease, inheritance, and mort-
gage. For the purpose of exercising 
these rights, the land law was to provide 
land use right certificates (LURC) to 
occupiers of both agricultural and 
nonagricultural land. However, due to 
various administrative complexities and 
the resultant delays, the process will not 
be finished until the end of 2010. 
This land law defined three aspects 
that clearly strengthened the rights 
allocated to land users and effectively 
conceded the existence of a real estate 
market: firstly, the law codified the alloca-
tion of the five rights in land; secondly, 
the state conceded the existence of a 
“market value” for land and defined the 
price for land lots and sites; and thirdly, 
the land law formalized land allocations 
by providing land use right certificates. 
However, the law did not take into ac-
count certain fundamentals of land 
management in a fast-growing transi-
tional economy. Among these were the 
burden of infrastructure development 
and the need for the fast and efficient 
transfer of land from agricultural to 
industrial and residential uses. 
The State passed this law before it 
decided on the direction of indus-
trialisation and modernisation. The 
subsequent revitalization of socio-eco-
nomic development, industrialisation, 
and modernisation required further 
improvements in land policy and legisla-
tion. Based on a comprehensive review of 
the previous 10 years, a new land law was 
passed in 2003. This law was intended to 
clarify the principle of the population’s 
ownership of land with specific benefi-
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cial rights and the role of the State as 
representative owner. It improved land 
policy for the agriculture sector whilst 
at the same time provided support on 
land policy which assisted the process of 
industrialisation and modernisation. 
Land-based Revenue in Vietnam
Land represents a valuable asset that re-
quires optimum utility. How to ensure an 
appropriate and optimal allocation and 
utilisation of land poses a serious chal-
lenge to transitional countries such as 
Vietnam. Land represents an important 
asset that is of concern to the population 
as well as government. Furthermore, 
land-use revenue is an important source 
of funds for the national budget. Despite 
implementation drawbacks, land-related 
revenue in Vietnam was based almost 
exclusively on the Agricultural Land 
Use Tax. The 1993 Land Law recognised 
that land had value, albeit through a 
government-based land “pricing mecha-
nism.” In addition, levies were set for new 
revenues based on a land-use charge, 
land rental, and the sale of State-owned 
housing. Figure 1 illustrates the impor-
tance of these land-based revenues for 
central government. Whilst such revenue 
is modest in comparison to the total 
taxes, charges, and fees, it nonetheless 
is a significant source of revenue. 
In the Vietnamese budget, no distinc-
tion is made between real property taxes 
and other real estate revenue sources. 
Besides the transfer tax levied when 
land users sell their land-use rights, 
there are two main forms of revenue: the 
single-event revenue sources and annual 
revenues. The single-event revenue is ob-
tained primarily from a land-use charge, 
land rental, and the sale of State-owned 
housing units in addition to other relat-
ed fees. The annual revenues are derived 
from the Agricultural Land Use Tax and 
the Tax on Buildings and Land. 
Land Use Charge
The Land Use Charge is levied when the 
State allocates land for use by individuals 
and organisations. It also is paid when 
the land use is changed, for example, 
from rented to allocated land or from 
a charge-free allocated land use to a 
charge-paid one. When agricultural land 
is changed to a nonagricultural land 
use, the Land Use Charge must be paid 
according to specific land categories. 
The charge is based on land prices de-
termined by local authorities. 
Levies on land use are an important 
source of revenue for the State and 
represent approximately 61 percent of 
all real estate revenue in the national 
budget. According to discussions in the 
Figure 1. Income from land-based revenue in Vietnam
Source: Based on data from General Statistics Office and Ministry of Finance
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Hanoi Parliament in November 2008, 
this revenue constitutes up to 46 percent 
of municipal budgets.
The Land Use Charge is based on “of-
ficial prices” which are 50 to 70 percent 
lower than the real market value of land. 
In order to obtain more accurate esti-
mates of the real value, the 2003 Land 
Law stipulates that land allocation for 
construction projects must be subject to 
open bidding procedures. As a result, the 
revenue from the Land Use Charge rose 
sharply, from 1,173 billion VND in 1996 
to 8,149 billion VND in 2003 and more 
than 16,500 billion VND in 2008 (1 mil-
lion VND = US$ 53.59). It is anticipated 
that the bidding policies will be extended 
and strengthened in order to establish a 
framework for more accurate estimates 
of market value. 
It is important to note, however, that 
the Land Use Charge is a one-time pay-
ment and does not generate recurrent 
revenues for the national government. 
It is anticipated that revenue from this 
source will decline in the future as more 
land is allocated with land-use rights.
Land Rent
The 2003 Land Law stipulates that land 
tenants can be individuals, corporations, 
joint-venture companies, foreign compa-
nies, or foreign diplomatic organisations. 
Under the law, users of land that is leased 
for residential, commercial, or other pro-
fessional activities must pay a land rental 
charge. The rental rate is fixed from the 
time the land is first occupied. Users can 
choose to pay the rent for the entire lease 
term in one lump-sum payment or in 
annual installments. Land leases can be 
renewed. Land rents as with most other 
taxes are remitted to the central govern-
ment with any future disbursement made 
from the central pool.
Land rent as a revenue source exhibits 
a number of problems. One is the use of 
relatively low rental rates. This shortcom-
ing can be attributed in part to the lack of 
competence of local governments in set-
ting rents notwithstanding the existence 
of central regulations on rental pricing. 
Indeed, local governments sometimes 
decide to reduce rents or not collect them 
at all as an incentive for investment, to 
promote social goals such as providing 
housing for disabled persons or war vet-
erans, or for other purposes.  
Sale of State-owned Housing
In 1994, the State introduced a program 
that allowed residents of state-owned 
housing units to purchase rights in the 
property. This program has been ex-
tremely successful in terms of the number 
of properties sold. Since implementa-
tion, approximately 45 percent of the 
State-owned housing stock has been sold 
representing close to 256,000 apartments 
comprising 11.6 million square metres 
(Ministry of Construction 2007). Figure 
2 illustrates the early growth in the sale of 
State-owned houses and the subsequent 
drop in revenues as the number of prop-
erties being sold has declined.
Tax on Transfer of Land Use Rights
The State in 1999 implemented a tax on 
the transfer of land-use rights. Tax rates 
were set at 10 percent for transferred 
agricultural land and 20 percent for 
the transfer of nonagricultural land-use 
rights. Currently, the registration rate of 
transferred properties is estimated to be 
only about 30 percent of all real estate 
transactions. Since January 1, 2009, the 
Tax on Transfer of Land Use Rights has 
been imputed to the corporate tax and 
personal income tax. The seller can 
choose to pay personal income tax on 25 
percent of the capital gain or 2 percent 
of the transaction value. 
The re-engineering of the land transfer 
tax into a corporate tax and a personal 
income tax has led to difficulties of per-
ception due to the absence of a rigorous 
method for determining the real estate 
capital gain. An appropriate system of 
market value appraisal of individual prop-
erties is fundamental to determining the 
correct taxable value. Without a regular 
inventory of market data registration, it is 
46  Journal of Property Tax Assessment & Administration • Volume 7, Issue 1
difficult to determine the fair market value of 
each transaction. It also makes it impossible 
to distinguish the gain derived from the land 
user’s investment and the added value gen-
erated by public investment. In most of the 
cases, the fiscal administrators are unable to 
identify the true value of the land including 
the improvements. Authorities tend to rely 
primarily on a process based on the owner’s 
self-declaration. 
Agricultural Land Use Tax
One of the most important land-based taxes 
in Vietnam is the Agricultural Land Use Tax 
introduced in 1993. The legislation covers 
all organisations and individuals using land 
for agricultural production. The tax applies 
to the use of cultivated land, water surfaces 
used for aquaculture, forest land, and any 
economic entity allocated agricultural land. 
There are three fundamental components 
of the tax base: the land size, the land cat-
egories, and the tax liability applied to each 
category. The law stipulates six categories 
for annual harvest and aquaculture land 
and five for long-term production land (see 
table 2). The land classification is based on 
five physical characteristics which include 
land fertility, location, topography, climatic 
conditions, and irrigation.
Interestingly, the tax liability is based on 
the land’s productive capacity as measured 
by “kilograms of rice” though the tax pay-
ment must be made in currency. Provincial 
and municipal authorities are responsible 
for determining the rice rate, based on local 
market prices. This amount cannot be less 
than 90 percent of the average price. 
In line with international trends to reduce 
the tax burden on agricultural production, 
the government in 2003 introduced an ex-
emption based on the “standard” land unit 
assigned to agricultural families, to poor 
communes, and to agricultural cooperatives 
(National Assembly 2003, Article 1.1). A 50 
percent reduction of the Agricultural Land 
Use Tax is provided to all other taxpayers. 
Other exemptions are available on agricul-
tural land in mountain locations, maritime 
areas, and poor regions. 
Figure 2. Revenue from the sale of state-owned houses
Table 2. Agricultural Land Use Tax liability
Land 
categories
Land for annual harvest 
and aquaculture 
(kg of rice/hectare)
Land for long-term 
production 
(kg of rice/hectare)
1 550 650
2 460 550
3 370 400
4 280 200
5 180 80
6 50  
Source: Article 8 of Decree 74/CP, October 25, 1993
Sources: General Statistics Office and Ministry of Finance
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These tax reduction and exemption 
policies have resulted in a sharp decline 
in revenues obtained from taxes on ag-
ricultural land use. The impact can be 
clearly seen in the diminishing revenues 
over the last decade (figure 3). In Ha-
noi, for example, the Agricultural Land 
Use Tax represented 0.83 percent of all 
land-based revenue in 2001 and only 
0.014 percent in 2006 (Hanoi Taxation 
Department 2008). At the national level, 
this revenue represented 3.05 percent of 
the total budget in 1996, 0.07 percent in 
2004, and 0.03 percent in 2008 according 
to data from the General Statistics Office 
and Ministry of Finance. 
Tax on Buildings and Land
The Tax on Buildings and Land is levied 
on nonagricultural land and on build-
ings (that is, the improvements made 
on the land). However, at present, these 
improvements are tax exempt. The con-
tribution of this tax to the budget has 
increased annually in absolute terms, 
but it has declined sharply in percentage 
terms. Figure 4 shows the revenue raised 
in actual and percentage terms.
Fragility of the Land-based 
Revenue Structure
In Vietnam, land use charges, land 
rental, and the selling of State-owned 
Figure 3. Agricultural land use tax
Figure 4. Revenue from the Tax on Buildings and Land
Sources: General Statistics Office and Ministry of Finance, 1995–2007
Sources: General Statistics Office and Ministry of Finance
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houses represent significant sources of 
revenue derived from land. However, 
they cannot be considered sustainable 
taxes because the revenue is received 
from one-time transactions as opposed to 
recurrent annual taxes. Income derived 
from these sources also tends to be vari-
able, unstable, and unpredictable which 
in turn causes budgetary forecasting is-
sues for the central government. 
Prior to 1994, land-related revenue 
was obtained almost exclusively from 
the Agricultural Land Use Tax. Then, 
new sources of revenue from land were 
introduced including the Land Use 
Charge, the Land Rent, and the Sale 
of State-owned Housing. Beginning in 
2004, with the exemptions and reduc-
tions in the Agricultural Land Use Tax, 
land-related revenues underwent signifi-
cant changes. Even though revenue from 
the Agricultural Land Use Tax declined 
from 1,902 billion in 1996 to 82 billion 
in 2008, total revenues from land grew 
exponentially from 5,421 billion VND in 
1996 to 27,068 billion in 2008. Income 
from the sale of State-owned housing 
reached 1,338 billion VND in 2004 and 
1,051 billion in 2008. Revenue from land-
use charges grew by more than 14 times 
during this period. 
However, looking more closely at 
the revenue structure, there are some 
concerns from an economic standpoint. 
As previously noted, land-use charges, 
land rentals, and State-owned housing 
sales are essentially one-event revenue 
sources. Among these three sources, 
the Land Use Charge represents the 
most important source of national 
government income, accounting for 
more than 70 percent of revenues in 
2004 and 61 percent in 2008. In a way 
though, by allocating land to individuals 
and other organisations, the State is, in 
effect, selling its property rights to the 
land users. This is similar to the one-time 
revenue from the privatisation and sale 
of State-owned enterprises. As a natural 
consequence, this revenue source will 
decline as more land is allocated to 
the private sector. The national budget 
requires sustainability, but this cannot 
be guaranteed since these one-event 
revenue sources have a finite life. This 
reality reveals the fragility of these land-
based taxes and charges as illustrated in 
figure 5.
The forgoing analysis would suggest 
that it is imperative to develop sustain-
able revenue sources that have the 
capacity to meet the shortfall in revenue 
caused by the declining importance of 
the Land Use Charge. Having one-event- 
based revenue sources contributing 
some 70 percent of total budget revenue 
is an over-reliance on a falling revenue 
base. Other revenue sources need to 
be considered. The Tax on Buildings 
and Land is a possible alternative, but it 
Figure 5. Revenue from one-event tax sources
Source: Based on data from General Statistics Office and Ministry of Finance
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currently raises only about 2.58 percent 
of land-based revenue and represents 
just 0.06 percent of the country’s gross 
domestic product (GDP). 
From a budget-forecasting perspec-
tive, it is important to balance budget 
revenues by developing sustainable in-
come from sources such as the annual 
taxes based on agricultural and nonag-
ricultural land uses. As noted earlier, the 
current Agricultural Land Use Tax is, in 
fact, a tax on production based on land 
size. However, the reality is that due to 
exemptions and reliefs, revenue from 
this source is declining. An annual tax on 
commercial, industrial, and residential 
land and improvements has significant 
potential. These taxes require additional 
consideration in terms of their optimisa-
tion and potential. Figure 6 highlights 
the imbalance among the land-based 
revenue sources in Vietnam. The income 
from the annual Tax on Buildings and 
Land declined sharply from 7 percent of 
all land-based revenues in 1996 to only 
2.5 percent in 2008. This clearly repre-
sents an unsustainable taxing structure 
for the government. Recognition of this 
situation is required to resource the 
sustainable land and property-based 
taxes as potential major future revenue 
sources.
The Current Real Property Tax 
System
The Tax on Buildings and Land was in-
troduced in 1992 and amended in 1994. 
It focuses on possessors of use rights to 
nonagricultural land for residential, 
commercial, and industrial purposes. 
Despite its name, the tax is applied to 
land only. Buildings and other improve-
ments are exempt. The tax is not an 
ad valorem tax. It is not calculated on 
market value but rather is area based. 
Variable tax rates are applied accord-
ing to different categories and location 
factors to reflect land productivity. In 
other instances, variants of area-based 
assessment are used. As an example, the 
assessment rate per square metre can be 
adjusted by a coefficient to reflect the 
location of a property within a particular 
zone in a city. 
The tax liability is determined on the 
basis of the land area, land categories, 
and the tax rate. Land categories are 
determined according to the following 
criteria: fertility, location, relief, climatol-
ogy, weather, irrigation, and productivity. 
This tax is difficult and expensive to 
administer, considering the lack of avail-
able data at the local level to assess and 
reassess land. As a result, land categories 
Figure 6. Proportions of one-event revenues and annual taxes from real property
Source: Based on data from General Statistics Office and Ministry of Finance
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lack any real correlation with the true value 
of land. 
The Tax on Buildings and Land was en-
acted prior to the 1993 Land Law. The tax 
rate is calculated in a similar manner to the 
tax on agricultural land use (see table 3). 
The land and housing tax utilises the same 
methodology of multiplying the kilogram 
of rice per unit land area by the rice price 
stipulated by the provincial People’s Com-
mittee. This figure is then multiplied by a 
tax rate coefficient which ranges from 3 to 
32 times the tax based on the agricultural 
land use for the highest category of land in 
the same region. Urban land is classified into 
categories in accordance with governmental 
regulations accounting for location and 
transportation facilities (Decree on Land 
and House Tax 1993, Article 6).
Table 3. Comparison of agricultural land use tax 
and real property tax
Tax 
categories
Tax 
base
Tax burden 
calculation
Adjustment
Tax on 
agricultural 
land use
Area Kilogram of 
rice per area 
unit × rice 
price
Five land categories
Tax on land 
and housing 
(real property 
tax)
Area Agricultural 
Land Use Tax 
× coefficient 
× rice price
Differentiated 
according to land 
categories: (1) land 
classification; (2) rural, 
suburban, or urban 
area; (3) location 
Source: Based on Agricultural Land Use Tax Law 
(1993) and Decree on Land and Housing Tax (1994)
Therefore, the real property tax is based 
on the highest agricultural land category 
which effectively ignores the fundamental 
rules of land value. Agricultural land clearly 
does not have the same productive capability 
as nonagricultural land. Hence, commercial 
and industrial land should be valued using 
different criteria than that used to value 
agricultural land. 
Applying a fiscal decentralisation policy, 
the district level supports the responsibili-
ties of land valuation and classification. This 
competence requires important investment 
and highly specialised skills in geology, ge-
ography, hydrology, rural economics, and 
valuation. In most instances, the decentra-
lised entities do not have sufficient personnel 
or the financial resources to fulfil this func-
tion. Neither do local governments have the 
means to ensure the equity and efficiency of 
the assessment system which can result in 
poorly determined tax assessments. 
Because the agricultural land categories 
are determined locally, it creates a major 
problem in applying this tax to urban areas. 
For example, Hanoi is not an optimal rice-
producing area because the land does not 
offer appropriate conditions for intensive 
rice cultivation. However, residential and 
commercial land in Hanoi tends to be the 
most valuable in the country. Assessing 
commercial/industrial/residential land use 
for tax purposes based on rice productiv-
ity as opposed to commercial profits from 
these higher land uses is not appropriate 
(Dang 2008). 
An additional shortcoming is the linkage 
to the price of rice in determining the tax 
burden. The law requires the use of the 
rice price for the year just prior to the tax 
year as determined by average prices in the 
local market. However, it is important to 
recognise that the market for rice may bear 
no correlation to real property values for 
nonagricultural land. During 2007 and 2008, 
for example, real estate prices increased 
whilst the price of rice did not change sig-
nificantly. It seems apparent that the price 
of rice is not a relevant basis upon which to 
assess a real property tax. In reality, the price 
of rice is becoming an irrelevant indicator of 
wealth. Thus, the inequity among taxpayers 
will become greater and, more importantly, 
the State will not benefit from the growth 
in residential and commercial real estate 
values. It is important to review the bases for 
these taxes to correct these failures and to 
promote land use efficiency. 
Tax Rate Analysis
The incidence of the property tax is of impor-
tance because it can indicate who is actually 
paying the tax. In order to analyse the situ-
ation in Vietnam, the effective tax rate was 
calculated for land in urban areas based on 
estimates of highest and lowest values. 
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The tax-rate coefficient is determined under 
the 1992 Ordinance as amended by the 1994 
Ordinance on the Tax on Buildings and Land 
(Article 1). The numbers can range from 3 
to 32. The coefficients shown in columns 3–6 
of table 4 are related to specific types of ur-
ban areas such as main cities and then based 
on street categories and location. The first 
column in table 4 contains the urban area 
or town categories. There are 731 cities in 
Vietnam classified by population, economic 
indicators, public infrastructure, and services. 
The “special” category applies to important 
cities such as Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. 
The fourth and fifth categories refer to ur-
ban areas located in plateau and mountain 
regions. The six urban-area categories are 
determined by central government.
Each urban-area category is further subdi-
vided by four street designations classified by 
location, revenue generation, and infrastruc-
ture quality (Decree on Land Pricing 188/
ND-CP, November 16, 2004, Article 10). Street 
categories are determined by the People’s 
Committee of the province or municipality. 
Within each street category, land is designated 
according to four location categories based on 
the following criteria: Location 1—land front-
ing a street with good vehicle access, Location 
2—land fronting a street with average vehicle 
access, Location 3—land fronting a street with 
no vehicle access, and Location 4—land hav-
ing extremely limited access.
Thus, land located in the special urban-area 
category (main city) in street category 1 and 
location 1 has a tax coefficient of 32 which is 
the highest possible (see table 4). Local tax 
officials have the responsibility of determining 
the relevant coefficients based on urban-area 
and street categories.  
For nonagricultural land use outside of 
urban areas, a coefficient of 2.5 applies to 
suburban land within the special category; a 
coefficient of 2 applies to the suburban land in 
categories I, II, III, and IV. In addition, a coef-
ficient of 1.5 applies to land situated alongside 
main roads and a coefficient of 1 applies to 
nonagricultural land use in rural areas.
Table 5 illustrates the effective tax rate 
across the various urban areas. Columns 6 
and 7 give the maximum and minimum land 
prices according to the urban-area category. 
As would be expected, the special urban area 
(main cities) has the highest land value whilst 
the poorest or lowest-value land is located 
in urban areas IV and V. The nominal tax 
(columns 3 and 5) is calculated based on the 
formula:
(550/10,000) × COEFFICIENT × 4,500
This formula is prescribed by legislation and 
is related to the price of rice per kilogram per 
square metre. There are 550 kilograms of rice 
produced per hectare, there are 10,000 square 
metres in a hectare, and the price of the rice is 
set at 4,500 VND per kilogram. Land located 
Table 4. Tax coefficients based on urban area, street 
category, and location
Urban-area 
categories 
Street 
categories
Coefficients based on Agricultural 
Land Use Tax
Location 
1
Location 
2
Location 
3
Location 
4
Special 
(four street 
categories)
1 32 28 23 17
2 30 26 21 14
3 27 23 18 12
4 25 21 16 9
Category I 
(four street 
categories)
1 30 26 21 14
2 27 23 18 12
3 25 21 16 9
4 22 18 13 8
Category II 
(four street 
categories)
1 26 22 17 11
2 25 21 16 10
3 23 19 14 8
4 21 17 12 7
Category III 
(four street 
categories)
1 19 17 13 8
2 18 16 11 7
3 17 14 9 6
4 14 11 7 5
Category IV 
(three 
street 
categories)
1 13 11 9 7
2 12 10 8 6
3 11 8 7 5
Category V 
(two street 
categories)
1 13 11 8 8
2 11 8 5 3
Source: Ministry of Finance. Part II, Circular 83TC/
TCT of October 7, 1994, guiding the execution 
of Decree 94/CP of August 25, 1994, on Tax on 
Buildings and Land 
52  Journal of Property Tax Assessment & Administration • Volume 7, Issue 1
in the best location of the special urban 
category has a coefficient of 32. Thus the 
tax becomes:
(550/10,000) × 32 × 4,500 = 7,920 VND per 
square metre
As can be seen, irrespective of the type 
of land and its productive capacity, the 
only variable in determining the tax li-
ability is the coefficient. 
Based on the tax rates and land pric-
ing currently in use in Vietnam, table 5 
reveals something of a paradox in the 
relationship between the effective tax 
rates and the values of the land. Within 
each urban-area category, a higher ef-
fective tax rate applies to lower-value 
land indicating that there is a greater tax 
liability levied on the poorest and lowest-
value land. This result implies that the 
users of the best and highest-value land 
pay less—an indication of an extremely 
regressive tax system.
As table 5 shows, the differences can be 
significant. For example, the poorest land 
located in the special urban area has an 
effective tax rate that is 24 times greater 
than the best land in the same location. 
The difference is even more startling 
when comparing the effective tax rates of 
the best and poorest land in urban areas 
IV and V. The figures there are 52 and 
103 respectively. A similar observation can 
be made when the effective tax rates are 
compared for the best land in different 
urban areas. For example, the effective 
tax rate for the best land in the special 
urban area is three times less than the 
tax rate for the best land in urban area V 
(0.0332 percent in comparison to 0.0117 
percent). These horizontal and vertical 
differences in effective tax rate between 
land of different values signify major 
inequity among taxpayers. It also under-
lines one reason why many people want 
to speculate and invest in real property 
located in the main cities: the effective tax 
burden is less in the cities in comparison 
to land located in rural areas.
However, an interesting question to 
consider is how well the system functions 
at a local level. Hanoi City region was 
used for this analysis and the results are 
presented in table 6. Hanoi is the most 
important administrative, political, and 
cultural city in Vietnam and is the loca-
tion for universities, major hospitals, and 
important office and retail centres. In a 
transitional economy, the quantity and 
quality of services that local authorities 
provide to their suburban and rural 
populations tend to be much lower than 
those provided to citizens living and 
working in major urban areas, such as 
downtown Hanoi. 
Table 6 indicates that the effective tax 
rate for the best land in the Hanoi Centre 
is 2.4 times lower than the lowest-value 
land in the same area and 10.5 times low-
er than the lowest-value rural residential 
land. From an economic perspective, this 
form of taxation is generating extremes 
Table 5. Tax rate analysis and comparison by urban-area categories 
Urban-area 
categories
Highest rate Lowest rate Land price Tax rate Tax rate 
comparisonCoefficient in VND Coefficient in VND Max. price 
(VND)
Min. price 
(VND)
Best land Poorest 
land
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 = 3/6 9 = 5/7 10 = 9/8
Special 32 7920.0 9 2227.5 67,500,000 1,500,000 0.01173% 0.14850% 13
I 30 7425.0 8 1980.0 42,500,000 400,000 0.01747% 0.49500% 28
II 26 6435.0 7 1732.5 30,000,000 150,000 0.02145% 1.15500% 54
III 19 4702.5 5 1237.5 19,500,000 120,000 0.02412% 1.03125% 43
IV 13 3217.5 5 1237.5 13,350,000 50,000 0.02410% 2.47500% 103
V 13 3217.5 3 742.5 6,700,000 30,000 0.04802% 2.47500% 52
Sources: Based on 2009 tax regulations and land pricing.
Note: The local price of rice in February 2008 was 4500 VND/kg
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in terms of regressivity. If land value can 
be used as a surrogate for ability to pay, 
then the current property tax system is 
favouring the wealthy at the expense of 
the poorer in the society. 
Revenues from Real Property Tax
As the previous calculation showed, the 
highest rate of the urban residential land 
tax is 7,920 VND per square metre. Thus, 
the owner of a 100-square-metre parcel 
in the highest-value area of Hanoi has to 
pay 792,000 VND in taxes per year. The 
State reference price for this land is 67.5 
million VND per square metre and the 
effective tax rate is 0.0117 percent. 
In absolute terms, income from the 
real property tax is increasing signifi-
cantly, from 380 billion VND in 1996 to 
698 billion VND in 2008 (figure 7). Nev-
ertheless, its contribution to the national 
budget has declined over the same pe-
riod, from 0.61 percent to 0.22 percent. 
It is interesting to note that the tax rate 
applied in other countries tends to vary 
from 1 to 4 percent of a property’s mar-
ket value. Former socialist transitional 
countries are aware of the potential that 
the real property tax has for national and 
local budgets. Many of these countries, 
shortly after adopting more market-
based policies, started to reform their 
real property tax systems. Table 7 gives 
a brief summary of the systems in opera-
tion in four such countries and Vietnam. 
By comparison, the effective tax rates in 
Vietnam are considerably less than those 
in the other selected countries. There is 
clearly significant potential for the real 
property tax to grow in terms of revenue 
for local budgets.
Conclusions
This article has sought to examine a 
number of the important issues around 
property taxation in Vietnam. The 
research indicates that a fundamental 
flaw of the system is the government’s 
reliance on declining property tax bases. 
Revenue from the Land Use Charge, 
Land Rent, and the Sale of State-owned 
Houses remains significant. However, 
their significance in revenue terms is 
declining as these taxes represent one-
event charges as opposed to annual 
recurrent taxes. As more land is allocated 
and more residential property is sold to 
occupiers, the current trend of shrinking 
tax bases and declining revenues will 
only continue in the future. 
Table 6. Tax rate comparison inside Hanoi City region
Land categories Coefficients Tax liabilities 
in rice (kg)
Tax liabilities  
in VND
Official prices Tax rate in 
2009
1 2 3 4 = 3 × current rice price 5 6 = 4/5
1. Hanoi Centre (Hoan Kiem)      
 Best land 32 1.76 7,920 67,500,000 0.0117%
 Poorest land 9 0.495 2,227.5 7,800,000 0.0286%
2. First class (Cau Dien)
 Best land 19 1.045 4,702.5 18,000,000 0.0261%
 Poorest land 9 0.495 2,227.5 5,600,000 0.0398%
3. Second class town (Soc Son)
 Best land 13 0.715 3,217.5 4,500,000 0.0715%
 Poorest land 3 0.165 742.5 1,250,000 0.0594%
4. Rural residential land
 Highest-priced (Thanh Tri) 1 0.055 247.5 1,356,000 0.0183%
 Lowest-priced (Soc Son) 1 0.055 247.5 200,000 0.1238%
Sources: Based on Decision 62/QD-UB of Hanoi People’s Committee on Land Pricing, December 31, 
2008; Department of Taxation regulations
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Table 7. Comparison of taxation systems in four east-European countries, Hanoi, and Vietnam
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania Slovenia Hanoi Vietnam
Population 1,307,605 2,245,423 3,565,205 2,007,711 3,490,000 85,150,000
Area (sq. km) 45,226 64,589 65,299 20,273 921.09 331,212
GDP per capita 
(US$)
21,100 17,400 17,700 27,200 2,500 1,200
Growth rate 2007 7.1% 10.2% 8.8% 6.1% 12.7% 8.0%
Tax on real 
property
Land tax Real estate 
tax (land and 
nonresidential 
buildings)
Building tax 
on property in 
commercial use; 
Land tax (not 
value-based)
Tax on buildings 
(built or 
buildable)
Tax on land only Tax on land only
Tax base Market 
value
Market value-
based mass 
(cadastral) 
value
Buildings: Based 
on average market 
value; Land: 
normative value
Points per sq. 
metre; value-
based property 
tax law pending
Land categories × 
coefficient × rice 
price
Land categories × 
coefficient ×  rice 
price
Tax rate 0.1%–2.5% 1% (reduced 
from 1.5% in 
2007)
Buildings: 0.3%–
1.0%; Land: 1.0%
Buildings: 0.1%–
0.5%, based on 
use; Land: 2%
Land:  
0.0117%–0.1238%
Land:  
0.0117%–2.475%
Real property tax 
as percentage of 
all local revenue 
(2007)
7.2% (2005) 5.2% 4.6% 8.2% 1.629% of all 
municipal revenues
0.37% of fiscal 
revenues; 0.185% 
of all state budget 
revenues
Sources: Malme and Youngman (2008); based on data from Ministry of Finance and General Statistics 
Office
The two main property taxes on land 
(as buildings and other improvements 
are not taxed) are the Agricultural Land 
Use Tax and the Tax on Buildings and 
Land. It is suggested that these two taxes 
have the potential to raise sufficient 
revenue to offset the declining revenue 
from other sources. However, the de-
sign of these taxes is currently flawed. 
The Agriculture Land Use Tax, which 
is based on rice productivity, has been 
significantly affected by the introduction 
Figure 7. Real property revenue as a percentage of GDP and state budget revenue
Source: Based on data from Ministry of Finance and General Statistics Office
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of broad exemptions and reliefs. The Tax 
on Buildings and Land, although direct-
ed at nonagricultural land, is linked to 
the Agricultural Land Use Tax. The tax 
liability is based on rice productivity and 
the price of rice. Although there is an 
adjustment made to reflect the location 
of the land, there is no direct correlation 
to the open-market value of the land. 
Land prices in Vietnam, and in par-
ticular in the main urban areas, have 
seen significant growth. The current 
system of property taxation has not been 
designed to capture any of this increase 
in property wealth. The research in this 
article indicates that when land values 
are factored into the analysis, the cur-
rent property tax is extremely regressive. 
Effective tax rates show that the users 
of the most valuable urban land pay 
considerably less that those users of 
lower-value land. 
The findings of this work would sug-
gest that the Tax on Buildings and Land 
could be re-engineered to remove the 
link to rice productivity and introduce 
a link to land values. The property 
market is maturing in Vietnam; there is 
evidence of sales and other transactions. 
Whilst the property registration system 
may require modernisation, there would 
appear to be sufficient market evidence 
upon which to consider a value-based 
land tax.
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